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Taming the Dragon:




To many observers, a major challenge raised by China’s accession to the WTO 
is whether the WTO dispute settlement system could cope with China, one 
of the major traders in the world with an economy that is halfway between a 
planned economy and a market economy. In this article, the author tries to 
answer this question by reviewing China’s experience in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Historically, the senior leadership in China attached dispro-
portionate importance to the WTO dispute settlement system and preferred 
to avoid using the system. Thus, in the first four cases in which China was 
sued or threatened to be sued in the WTO, China tried to keep a low profile 
and settled the cases with the complainants. As more and more cases are being 
brought against China, however, the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system as a trade policy tool in dealing with China has gradually faded 
away. This is illustrated by China’s reactions to the cases brought against it 
over the past two years, where China has taken a more and more legalistic ap-
proach. While China, just as any other WTO Member, has every right to use 
the WTO dispute settlement system, an over-aggressive strategy against China 
runs the risk of dragging everyone into trade wars, which is not conducive to 
the solution of trade disputes. 
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To many observers, a major practical question raised by China’s accession to 
the WTO is: can the WTO dispute settlement system cope with China? While 
this is not a significant question regarding most other WTO Members, it is a 
serious question in the case of China, as the inherent nature of China seems 
to be at odds with the WTO dispute settlement system. While the WTO dis-
pute settlement system is a legalistic rule-based dispute settlement system that 
has been regarded as ‘the most important international tribunal’,1 China is a 
country that has long been perceived as one that defies international standards, 
one that cherishes its hard-won sovereignty so much that it generally shuns the 
jurisdictions of international tribunals, even though some of its citizens have 
served or are serving as judges in these tribunals. 
Two more factors further complicate the situation. First, unlike most other 
international tribunals, which normally do not have compulsory jurisdiction, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) does enjoy mandatory jurisdiction 
for the following reasons: 
a)  The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (hereinafter the ‘Dispute Settlement Understanding’ or 
DSU) is a multilateral agreement rather than a plurilateral agreement, 
which means that all WTO Members must accept this agreement as part 
of their terms of membership in the WTO; 
b)  According to Articles 3 and 23 of the DSU, Members shall adhere to 
‘the rules and procedures’ in the DSU, and shall ‘have recourse to, and 
abide by, the rules and procedures’ of the DSU in seeking ‘the redress of 
a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any 
objective of the covered agreements’; 
c)  Thanks to the new ‘reverse consensus’ principle established in Articles 
6, 16 and 17 of the DSU, the consent of the responding Member is no 
longer needed for the initiation of the dispute settlement process or the 
adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports. 
Second, as noted by the former Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secre-
tariat, the major traders are usually also the major users of the WTO dispute 
settlement system.2 For example, the two largest traders, the United States and 
the European Communities, are the most active participants in the dispute 
1.  Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, 
Oxford, 2003, at p.18. 
2.  Valerie Hughes, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future’, in Henry Gao and Don 
Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, at pp. 272–273.
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settlement system, while the other major traders, such as Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand, are also very active.3 
Even before its accession to the WTO, China was already one of the major 
traders of the world, as well as one of the most important trading partners of 
most countries in the world. Also, as China has yet to develop a mature mar-
ket economy, there are many problems in the economic and trade policies of 
China. Before China’s accession to the WTO, its trade partners could only try 
to resolve these issues through bilateral negotiations. After China’s accession, 
however, they have every right to drag China before the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body regarding any trade issues. As argued by Ostry, this could result 
in ‘a flood of disputes [which] could overwhelm the already over-burdened 
system’.4 As the Chinese foreign policy is deeply state-centric and puts great 
emphasis on protection of sovereignty, however, China might regard these ac-
tions as political and simply reject the process in an effort to save face.5 If that 
happens, the credibility of the system would be seriously undermined. 
On the other hand, some other observers, especially multinational cor-
porations with experience in China, argue that that there will be very few, 
if any, disputes.6 Fearing retaliation by the Chinese government for WTO 
complaints, the business communities might prefer informal behind-the-scenes, 
government-to-government talks to work out some deals. This, however, could 
result in a two-track trading system with one set of transparent dispute-settle-
ment rules for all other WTO members and another set of opaque bilateral 
arrangements for China. Other WTO Members would question the fairness of 
such arrangements, and this again could cast doubt on the credibility or even 
legitimacy of the system.
While such a ‘Catch-22’ situation is theoretically possible, the author argues 
in this article that neither scenario has actually materialized. Instead, the WTO 
dispute settlement system has been quite effective in dealing with China. This 
conclusion is drawn by the author’s review of China’s post-accession experi-
ence with the WTO dispute settlement system. Since its accession, China has 
participated in one case as the complainant, i.e., the United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (hereafter ‘US-Steel 
Safeguards’) case; five disputes (eight cases)7 as the respondent, i.e. the China 
3.  Ibid.
4.  Sylvia Ostry, ‘WTO Membership for China: To Be and Not to Be: Is that the Answer?’ in Patrick 
Grady and Andrew Sharpe (eds.), The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David 
Slater, 2001, p. 263.
5.  Ibid.
6.  Ibid.
7.  In the WTO, a single trade measure of a Member might be simultaneously challenged by several 
WTO Members. Each Member is entitled to bring their separate complaint, which will be as-
signed a unique case number. In order to ensure consistency and efficiency in the dispute settle-
ment Panel’s examination of the measure, however, the WTO normally would establish only 
one Panel for such dispute and the Panel will examine all complaints in this dispute. Thus, one 
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– Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (hereafter ‘VAT Rebate’) case, the 
China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (hereafter ‘Auto Parts’) 
case, the China – Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions 
from Taxes and Other Payments (hereafter ‘Subsidies’)case, the China – Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter 
‘TRIPS’) case, and the China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products 
(hereafter ‘Publications’) case. In addition, China barely missed being brought 
before the WTO in two other cases, i.e., the case on coke export restraints and 
the case on antidumping duties on kraft linerboard. In the following sections, 
these cases will be discussed in chronological order. 
II. US-Steel Safeguards
This case concerned definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain flat 
steel, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, certain welded tubular products, 
carbon and alloy fittings, stainless steel bar, stainless steel rod, tin mill prod-
ucts and stainless steel wire. It was brought by China in March 2002 along 
with seven other Members, including European Communities, Japan, Korea, 
Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and Brazil. In its request for Consultations, 
China claimed that the US measures were inconsistent with various provisions 
of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguard Agreement. On 11 July 2003, the Panel 
circulated its Report and concluded that all of the United States’ safeguard 
measures at issue were inconsistent with at least one of the following WTO 
prerequisites for the imposition of a safeguard measure, i.e., (i) unforeseen de-
velopments; (ii) increased imports; (iii) causation; and (iv) parallelism.8 These 
conclusions were ultimately affirmed by the Appellate Body in its report issued 
on 10 November 2003, albeit on slightly different grounds.9 
According to Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement, WTO Members, 
which would be affected by safeguard measures, have the right to retaliate 
against the Member invoking such measures by suspending the application of 
dispute in the WTO might encompass several cases. See e.g. Article 9 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). 
8.  Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, 
WT/DS248, WT/DS249, WT/DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, 
WT/DS259, adopted 10 December 2003, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/
DS248AB/R, WT/DS249AB/R, WT/DS251AB/R, WT/DS252AB/R, WT/DS253AB/R, WT/
DS254AB/R, WT/DS258AB/R, WT/DS259AB/R. 
9.  Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, WT/DS248AB/R, WT/DS249AB/R, WT/DS251AB/R, WT/DS252AB/R, WT/
DS253AB/R, WT/DS254AB/R, WT/DS258AB/R, WT/DS259AB/R, adopted 10 December 
2003.
China’s Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
373
substantially equivalent concessions to the trade of such Member. Of course, 
the same article also provides that the right of suspension shall not be exer-
cised for the first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided 
that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in 
imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions of the Safeguards 
Agreement. Even though, at least according to the US, some of the safeguards 
measures taken in this case were based on absolute import increases, their con-
formity with the WTO rules in the Safeguard Agreement had been called into 
question from the very beginning. Thus, China could have taken justice into 
its own hands by retaliating against the US. Indeed, that is exactly what the 
EU, one of the co-complainants in the case, did. On 13 June 2002, the EC is-
sued Council Regulation No. 1031/2002. According to this regulation, the EC 
would suspend its tariff concessions granted to the US from 18 June 2002 and 
apply additional duties of up to 100 per cent on such products from as early as 
1 August 2002.10 The retaliation list includes products from many politically 
sensitive states, such as citrus fruits (Florida), textiles (Carolinas), and Harley-
Davidson motorcycles (Wisconsin). Unlike the EU, however, China seems to 
be content to choose the multilateral route. 
Whether the other WTO Members realize it or not, this case reveals a 
significant shift in China’s foreign trade policy. Before this case, China was 
a frequent user of retaliatory measures. For example, in 2001, when Japan 
imposed safeguard measures on Chinese onions, mushrooms and tatami rushes 
valued at 150 million USD, China quickly responded with 100 per cent extra 
tariffs on the 1 billion USD imports of automobiles, mobile phones and air-
conditioners from Japan.11 In the same year, when Korea slapped a 315 per 
cent tariff on the imports of Chinese garlic worth some 20 million USD, China 
threatened a temporary ban on cellular phones and polyethylene goods from 
Korea, which together were worth more than 660 million USD.12 One might 
argue that this policy shift is simply because that, before its accession, China 
could not use the WTO dispute settlement system; while after accession, it is 
required by Article 23 of the DSU to ‘have recourse to, and abide by, the rules 
and procedures of [the DSU]’. While there is some truth in this argument, it 
could not explain why Article 23 of the DSU has not stopped the US from 
applying various highly controversial unilateral measures, such as the Section 
301 clauses.13 Furthermore, as the author pointed out above, Article 8 of the 
10.  Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Council Regulation No. 1031/2002 (emphasis added).
11.  For the background on this case, see Japan-China Trade War at a Crossroads: Experts, available at 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200106/25/eng20010625_73422.html>. For a detailed discus-
sion of this case, see Junji Nakagawa, ‘Lessons from the Japan–China “Welsh Onion War”’, (2002) 
36 Journal of World Trade, at pp. 1019–1036.
12.  For the background on this case, see South Korea to Import Chinese Garlic to Avoid Trade War, 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200104/17/eng20010417_67867.html>. 
13.  For a classical review of the Section 301, see Robert E. Hudec, ‘Thinking about the New Section 
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Safeguards Agreement does provide the possibility of retaliation without seek-
ing the authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body first. 
Defying some of the gloomy predictions mentioned earlier, China seems to 
be quite willing, at least in this case, to abide by the uniform rules for all WTO 
Members rather than trying to force upon the other WTO Members ‘another 
set of opaque bilateral arrangements’. Moreover, while this case sets an exam-
ple of China trying to defend its interests using the WTO dispute settlement 
system, the subsequent history shows that China has been very cautious even 
in asserting its right to use the dispute settlement system: more than four years 
after China’s accession, this case remains as the first and only complaint China 
ever launched in the WTO. Indeed, as the top target of trade remedy measures 
worldwide, if China were to challenge each and every trade remedy measures 
taken against it in the WTO, the WTO dispute settlement system would not 
have any capacity left to deal with any other disputes filed by other Members. 
Fortunately, China so far has not shown any interest in opening up the flood-
gate. As the author has argued in another article, China’s decision to join the 
Steel Safeguard case was driven almost entirely by the unique factors in this 
case, such as the assistance of a strong team of co-complainants, bad publicity 
against the US from the very beginning, as well as the political calculations 
underlying the case.14 Once these factors are gone, China has been trying to 
avoid resorting to the dispute settlement mechanism as much as it could.
III. China – Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits 
This case was brought by the US in March 2004 and was also the first case ever 
brought against China by any WTO Member. It concerned China’s rebates for 
value-added tax (VAT) on integrated circuits (ICs) manufactured or designed 
in China. In its Request for Consultations, the United States identified its basis 
as follows:
‘China provides for a 17 per cent VAT on ICs. However, we understand that 
enterprises in China are entitled to a partial refund of the VAT on ICs that 
they have produced, resulting in a lower VAT rate on their products. China 
therefore appears to be subjecting imported ICs to higher taxes than applied to 
domestic ICs and to be according less favourable treatment to imported ICs.
301: Beyond Good and Evil’, in Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law, Cameron May, 
1999, at pp. 153–206. 
14.  Henry Gao, ‘Aggressive Legalism: the East Asian Experience and Lessons for China’, in Hen-
ry Gao and Don Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, at 
pp. 324–329.
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In addition, we understand that China allows for a partial refund of VAT 
for domestically-designed ICs that, because of technological limitations, are 
manufactured outside of China. China thus appears to be providing for more 
favourable treatment of imports from one Member than another, and dis-
criminating against services and service suppliers of other Members’.15
Even though a total of six regulations issued by various Chinese ministries from 
June 2000 to December 2003 had been identified by the US as measures at 
issue,16 the only one that really mattered was the regulation that provided the 
key framework for the rebate scheme. This is the Notice of the State Council 
Regarding Issuance of Certain Policies to Promote the Development of the Software 
Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry of 24 June 2000, popularly known as 
‘Document 18’ because its file number is 2000-18. Article 41 of Document 18 
provided a rebate of the amount of the effective VAT burden in excess of 6 
per cent for ICs manufactured within China, while the statutory VAT rate on 
sales of all imported and domestically-produced ICs was 17 per cent.17 Article 
48 of the same document, together with the Notice of the Ministry of Finance, 
State Administration of Taxation Regarding Tax Policies for Imports of Integrated 
Circuit Products Domestically Designed and Fabricated Abroad, provided a tax 
rebate of the amount of the effective VAT burden in excess of 6 per cent for 
ICs designed in China but fabricated abroad due to the lack of technological 
capacities domestically. 
According to the US, these measures violated China’s obligations under 
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994, the Protocol on the Accession of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (WT/L/432), and Article XVII of the GATS. The US 
did not elaborate on how these measures violated the relevant obligations, but, 
in the view of the author, the arguments would be essentially the following:
15.  China – Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS309/1.
16.  They are: Document 18 (24 June 2000), Notice of the State Council Regarding Issuance of Certain 
Policies Concerning the Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry; Docu-
ment 25 (22 September 2000), Notice of the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation, 
and General Administration of Customs on Relevant Tax Policy Issues Concerning Encouraging the 
Development of the Software Industry and the Integrated Circuit Industry; Document 86 (7 March 
2002), Notice of the Ministry of Information Industry Regarding Issuance of Regulations on Certifica-
tion of Integrated Circuit Design Enterprises and Products; Document 70 (10 October 2002), Notice 
of the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation Regarding Furthering Tax Policies to 
Encourage the Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry; Document 140 
(25 October 2002), Notice of the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation Regarding 
Tax Policies for Imports of Integrated Circuit Products Domestically Designed and Fabricated Abroad; 
and Document 1384 (23 December 2003), Notice of the State Administration of Taxation Regard-
ing Issuance of the Catalogue of Integrated Circuit Products Enjoying Preferential Tax (First Batch).
17.  On 10 October 2002, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation issued an-
other notice to further expand the VAT rebate to any tax burden that exceeds 3 per cent.
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1. The Article 41 rebate makes the VAT rate for domestically manufactured 
ICs lower than that for imported ICs, and thus violates the national treat-
ment obligation under GATT Article III;
2. For imported products, the Article 48 rebate makes the VAT rate for those 
designed in China lower than that for those designed abroad, and thus 
violates the most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligation under GATT Article 
I;
3. For IC design services and service providers, the Article 48 rebate makes 
the VAT rate for those services and service providers in China lower than 
the rate for those services and service providers abroad, and thus violates 
the national treatment obligation under GATS Article XVII.
China’s initial reaction to the US complaint was rather interesting. On 19 
March, a day after the US made its Request for Consultations, Mr. Chong 
Quan, the spokesperson for MOFCOM, announced that China was ‘confused’ 
by the US request.18 According to him, China and the US had held several 
rounds of bilateral consultations on the IC VAT rebate issue and made certain 
progress.19 Since the US ‘suddenly’ brought a Request for Consultation in 
the WTO while the two parties were conducting consultations already, China 
felt puzzled.20 Nonetheless, he added, China had started to study the US re-
quest seriously.21 Actually, it is probably more accurate to say that China was 
embarrassed rather than ‘puzzled’. According to the Confucianism philosophy 
which is deeply rooted in the Chinese society, litigation would cause irreparable 
harm to the normal relationships and should be pursued only as a last resort, 
or, better still, as the great philosopher himself would have preferred, avoided 
as much as possible.22 To a large extent, the Chinese leadership still could 
not disentangle the legal issues from the political and diplomatic concerns 
and viewed the initiation of legal disputes in the WTO as synonymous to the 
break-up of diplomatic relations with the other countries. One might argue, 
however, that China should not ‘do to others what she does not want done 
to herself’;23 as China has sued the US in the WTO in the Steel Safeguards 
case already, and it is only fair that China should expect to be sued in the 
same forum. While this argument seems plausible on its face, the author has 
to disagree, as the Steel Safeguards case is very different from the current case. 
18.  People’s Daily, 20 March 2004, Headlines, at p.3.
19.  Ibid.
20.  Ibid, emphasis added.
21.  Ibid.
22.  James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Volume One: Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yan Yuan, Chap-
ter XIII, ‘The Master said, ‘In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary, 
however, is to cause the people to have no litigations’. The full text is available at <http://www.
gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cnfnl10u.txt>. 
23.  James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Volume One: Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yan Yuan. 
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In that case, the US was actually urging the complainants to bring the case to 
the WTO dispute settlement system. In a letter dated 11 March 2002 to the 
then WTO Director General Mike Moore, Deputy USTR Linnet Deily liter-
ally begged the other WTO Members to file a WTO complaint by noting, in 
three different paragraphs, that ‘[t]o the extent [a WTO Member] considers 
that the USITC’s findings … incorrect’, it must ‘bring its complaint … before 
the World Trade Organization to be resolved under multilaterally-agreed dis-
pute settlement procedures’, which is ‘the right place to resolve differences’.24 
While this seems rather bizarre on its face, it is actually very rational: as dis-
cussed above, the Safeguards Agreement explicitly grants affected Members the 
right to retaliate in such cases; thus, for the US, WTO litigation is actually 
the lesser of the two evils. In the discussed case, however, China had preferred 
consultation over litigation along the way, and was really caught off-guard by 
the launch of the formal dispute settlement procedure by the US. 
After several rounds of consultations, China agreed to settle the case with 
the US by signing the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the 
United States Regarding China’s Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits on 14 
July 2004. Essentially, China agreed to give in to the requests of the US, with 
the detailed terms as follows:
By 1 November 2004, China will amend the measures described in the US 
consultation request (WT/DS309/1) to eliminate the availability of VAT 
refunds to firms producing ICs in China on their domestic sales. The effec-
tive date of these amendments will be no later than 1 April 2005. Until the 
effective date of these amendments, VAT refunds will be available only to 
integrated circuit enterprises certified under the measures as of 14 July 2004 
in respect of products so certified as of 14 July 2004.
By 1 September 2004, China will issue a notice to revoke the measure de-
scribed in the US consultation request (WT/DS309/1) that provides for VAT 
refunds on ICs designed in China but manufactured abroad. The effective 
date of revocation will be no later than 1 October 2004.
Several factors contributed to the prompt settlement of this dispute. The first 
was the economic factor. Even though Document 18 was drafted with the 
intention of promoting the development of the home-grown IC industry,25 
its practical effect was exactly the opposite. The rebate schemes were based on 
24.  The United States Mission to the European Union, USTR’s Deily Defends Steel Tariffs Deci-
sion, Rebuts EC Demands, <http://www.useu.be/Categories/Trade/Steel/Mar1102USTRDeilySteel.
html>. 
25.  Preamble of Notice of the State Council Regarding Issuance of Certain Policies to Promote the Develop-
ment of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry.
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the effective tax rate, which equalled the total tax payable divided by sales.26 
Because China provided a 100 per cent VAT rebate for IC product exports, a 
firm had to sell at least 70-80 per cent of its products domestically and achieve 
a gross profit margin of 30 per cent or more in order to be able to enjoy the 
Article 41 rebate.27 Since most of the Chinese firms exported about 70–80 
per cent of their products and had a low gross profit margin, very few of them 
could enjoy the rebates.28 On the other hand, the foreign-invested IC firms in 
China focused on high-end products and thus had a much higher gross profit 
margin.29 They also sold most of their products within China. As Document 
18 applies to all firms irrespective of the ownership structure,30 most of the 
firms that were able to benefit from the rebate schemes were actually foreign-
invested firms, such as Motorola.31 
The second is the political factor. As mentioned above, the mere threat of 
legal action itself would be interpreted by the Chinese leadership as something 
of great political and diplomatic significance. In order to avoid the political 
embarrassment, China would rather settle than have to endure the full vigour 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Another interesting development in this case is that Taiwan also formally 
requested to join the consultations.32 Legally speaking, Taiwan is a Member 
in its own right in the WTO with the (rather awkward) official name as ‘The 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu’, abbre-
viated as ‘Chinese Taipei’. China, however, has consistently claimed Taiwan 
to be one of its separate custom territories and asked Taiwan to behave ac-
cordingly. Actually Taiwan’s status in the WTO has never been made clear. 
Even though Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement states that ‘[a]ny state 
or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations’ may apply for WTO Membership, it is unclear 
as to whether Taiwan joined as a ‘state’ or ‘separate customs territory’. China 
and Taiwan seem to have subscribed to different versions of the story. On the 
one hand, China claims that Taiwan is a separate customs territory of China, 
because Taiwan’s official title includes the term ‘Separate Customs Territory’ 
while the abbreviated name refers to ‘Chinese Taipei’, which, put together, 
26.  See e.g., Behind the Tax Rebate Dispute (visited 3 August 2005) <http://www.ccw.com.cn/news2/
zl/htm2004/20040811_119N2.asp>. 
27.  See IC Dispute Escalated, the US Brought Lawsuit against China’s Discriminative VAT Policy (visited 
3 August 2005) <http://it.sohu.com/2004/03/20/82/article219518220.shtml>. 
28.  Ibid.
29.  Ibid.
30.  Article 52 of Notice of the State Council Regarding Issuance of Certain Policies Concerning the De-
velopment of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry. 
31.  See IC Dispute Escalated, the US Brought Lawsuit against China’s Discriminative VAT Policy (visited 
August 3, 2005) <http://it.sohu.com/2004/03/20/82/article219518220.shtml>.
32.  Request to Join Consultations, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 5 April 2004, WT/DS309/5. 
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means that Taiwan is a ‘separate customs territory’ of China. On the other 
hand, Taiwan could claim that, rather than implying that Taiwan is a part of 
China, the word ‘Chinese’ in ‘Chinese Taipei’ could simply refer to ‘people 
of Chinese descent’.33 Indeed, since Hong Kong and Macau, two Members 
which are undoubtedly territories of China, have their names as ‘Hong Kong, 
China’ and ‘Macau, China’, respectively, and Taiwan joined the WTO after 
these two territories did, if the WTO Members wanted to confirm that Tai-
wan has the same status as Hong Kong and Macau, they should have used 
‘Taiwan, China’ instead of ‘Chinese Taipei’. Furthermore, its full title does 
not indicate the proper sovereign of such ‘separate customs territory’. Indeed, 
a precondition for any separate customs territory to join the WTO is that it 
has been granted ‘full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial 
relations’ by its sovereign, but Taiwan has not requested China nor has China 
granted Taiwan such autonomy. Putting this difficult question aside, Taiwan’s 
request to join consultations has really irritated China. Even though the mere 
participation of a Member in the WTO dispute settlement system would not 
entail any connotations of sovereignty, since a separate customs territory is fully 
entitled to such a right, both China and Taiwan regarded such act as implying 
that Taiwan was on par with China as an equal sovereign. 
On 28 April 2004, China filed an Acceptance of the Requests to Join 
Consultations.34 In this communication, China acknowledged the requests 
from the EC, Japan, Mexico, and Taiwan to join the consultations, but only 
the first three requests were declared to be accepted. This is rather strange, as 
requests to join consultations have rarely been denied in the WTO. According 
to Article 4.11 of the DSU, ‘[w]henever a Member other than the consulting 
Members considers that it has a substantial trade interest in consultations be-
ing held pursuant to para. 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, para. 1 of Article 
XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements, 
such Member may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within ten 
days after the date of the circulation of the request for consultations under said 
Article, of its desire to be joined in the consultations. Such Member shall be 
joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which the request 
for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest is 
well-founded’. Thus, there are three requirements for a Member to file the 
request to join consultations: 
First, the request shall be filed within ten days after the date of the circula-
tion of the request for consultations. In this case, the US request for consulta-
tions was circulated on 23 March, while the Taiwan request was made on 1 
April, and thus is within the time limit. 
33.  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edition. 
34.  WT/DS309/6. 
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Second, such Member has to have a ‘substantial trade interest’. Again, 
Taiwan seems to satisfy this requirement as well, as Taiwan noted in its re-
quest that ‘[a]ccording to our customs statistics, we are one of China’s largest 
suppliers of integrated circuits. In 2003, China’s imports from us reached a 
total value of about US$ 1.8 billion. This figure, as a matter of act, has been 
increasing annually at the rates of 13.9 per cent, 181.6 per cent and 105.1 per 
cent for each of the last three years’.35 
Third, the respondent in the case has to agree that the claim of substantial 
interest is well founded. This requirement is rather subjective and China, as 
the respondent in this case, had the full discretion in determining whether 
Taiwan’s claim of substantial interest was well founded. Even though China 
had not indicated in its communication as to whether Taiwan’s claim was well 
founded, this was probably the only ground on which China could deny the 
request from Taiwan. However, to counter the unrestrained discretion of the 
respondent, the same DSU article also states that ‘[i]f the request to be joined 
in the consultations is not accepted, the applicant Member shall be free to 
request consultations under para. 1 of Article XXII or para. 1 of Article XXIII 
of GATT 1994, para. 1 of Article XXII or para. 1 of Article XXIII of GATS, 
or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements’. Furthermore, 
according to well-established WTO jurisprudence, there is no requirement for 
either an economic/trade interest or legal interest for a Member to invoke the 
WTO dispute settlement procedures; instead, a potential interest in trade in 
goods or services at issue and a general interest in preserving the rule-based 
system is sufficient.36 Thus, Taiwan could have brought a separate complaint 
on its own. In the author’s view, the public humiliation that the complaint by 
Taiwan might bring to the Chinese leadership was probably another important 
reason that made China decide to settle promptly, even though the legal merits 
of such a case are debatable.37 
IV. China – Measures Affecting the Export of Coke
Less than two weeks after the US launched its case against China’s VAT rebate 
on ICs, the EC also openly challenged China’s measures affecting the exports 
35.  WT/DS309/5.
36.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997: II, 591, paras 
136–138; Panel Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
WT/DS98/R and Corr.1, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS98/AB/R, DSR 2000: I, 49, para. 7.13. 
37.  See Henry Gao, ‘Aggressive Legalism: the East Asian Experience and Lessons for China’, in 
Henry Gao and Don Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, at 
pp. 332–333. 
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of coke, requesting China to abolish the measures or face another case at the 
WTO. 
Coke, which is produced by heating the coal in a high-temperature, oxy-
gen-free furnace, is the main fuel used in making steel from iron ore. China is 
the world’s top producer and exporter of coke. In 2003, the total global coke 
output was 390 million Metric Tons (MT), with the Chinese production at 
177 million MT, or 45 per cent of the world total production.38 In the same 
year, China’s coke export reached 14.7 million MT, nearly 60 per cent of the 
world’s total.39 The EU, in particular, relies heavily on coke imports from 
China. In 2003 alone, the EC imported from China 4.4 million MT of coke, 
which is more than one third of its total coke consumption.40 On the other 
hand, the coke production process can cause serious pollution to the environ-
ment. Typically, two MT of coal can produce one MT of coke, while the rest 
turns into pollutants such as wastewater, atmospheric emissions, and solid 
wastes. Among them are sulphur dioxide, a major cause for acid rain, and ben-
zopyrene, one of the worst carcinogenic chemicals. In recent years, many coke 
plants were closed in the EC due to pressure from environmental protection 
groups. At the same time, however, the EC is home to four of the top ten steel 
manufacturers.41 Thus, the European steel industry relied more and more on 
coke imports from China. This increasing gap between supply and demand 
drove the price of coke in international markets from $56/MT FOB in 2000 
to $400/MT FOB in 2004. Concerned with the potential environmental im-
plications, the Chinese government also started to study the pollution problem 
caused by coke-production. In July 2003, the Ministry of Commerce and 
the National Development and Reform Commission held a joint meeting on 
coke exports with several industry associations. At the meeting, many experts 
suggested that the government limit coke exports to reduce pollution. On 1 
January 2004, China announced that it would cut down its coke export quota 
by 26 per cent from 12 million tons for 2003 to 9 million tons to meet the 
rising demand from its own booming steel and power industries and to reduce 
pollutions resulting from the coke production process.42 Worried that it 
would not have enough coke for its domestic steel industries, the EC demanded 
that China abolish the quota on 31 March 2004. On 9 May, the EC further 
announced a five-day deadline for the Chinese to get rid of the quota; other-
wise it would initiate a complaint at the WTO. After extensive negotiations, 
38.  China Metals Report Weekly, 8 June 2004. 
39.  Ibid.
40.  Ibid.
41.  According to the International Iron and Steel Institute, of the top ten steel firms in 2003, four 
of them are EC firms. They are Arcelor (Luxemburg), LNM Group (Netherlands), Corus Group 
(UK/Netherlands), and ThyssenKrupp (Germany). See World Steel in Figures 2004, available at 
<http://www.worldsteel.org/media/wsif/wsif2004.pdf> (visited 3 August 2005).
42.  Xinhua News Agency, 24 May 2004. 
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China reached a last-minute deal with the EC on 28 May 2004, removing the 
imminent threat of a WTO complaint. Under the agreement, the European 
steel industry received at least 4.5 million MT of coke from China in 2004, 
the same quantity it imported in 2003. China also agreed to abolish the fee 
for the export permit, and this reduced the price of coke from $450/MT to 
$250/MT. 
As no formal complaint had been lodged at the WTO, the exact legal basis 
of the EU’s claim is unclear. In the author’s view, however, the most likely 
candidate would be Article XI.1 of the GATT, which provides that ‘[n]o pro-
hibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any 
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or 
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contract-
ing party’. As the author has discussed in another article, however, the legal 
claims of the EC might not be as strong as it would want others to believe.43 
Indeed, China could have some strong counter-arguments by making use of the 
escape clauses provided for under Articles XI.2 and XX. Moreover, while the 
EC itself has closed its coke-production factories for environmental concerns, it 
still wants China to supply coke to its steel firms at the expense of polluting the 
environment in China. In essence, what the EC was doing in this case amounts 
to exporting pollutions to China. For the EU, launching such a complaint in 
the WTO might create more trouble than it tries to get rid of. It would put 
the EC in the same awkward situation as the US was in three years ago, when 
the US had to withdraw amid worldwide condemnation its complaint against a 
Brazilian law authorizing manufacturing of pharmaceutical products combating 
HIV/AIDS, a case Celso Amorim, the outspoken Brazilian ambassador to the 
WTO, called as not only ‘legally unfounded’, but also ‘politically disastrous’.44 
So the question is: why did China want to settle, and settle so quickly? 
As discussed above, according to Section 15(a) of China’s Accession Pro-
tocol, WTO Members may treat China as a non-market economy in anti-
dumping investigations for 15 years after China’s accession to the WTO. This 
does not mean, however, that China would always be regarded as non-market 
economy for the whole period. Indeed, the same section also provides that, 
once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO 
Member, that it is a market economy, the non-market economy method shall 
43.  Henry Gao, ‘Aggressive Legalism: the East Asian Experience and Lessons for China’, in Hen-
ry Gao and Don Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, at 
pp. 334–348. 
44.  WTO Reporter, United States Drops WTO Case Against Brazil Over HIV/AIDS Patent Law, 
26 June 2001). 
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be terminated.45 Since its accession, China has launched a major campaign 
to lobby other WTO Members to recognize China’s market economy status. 
Typically, this is included as part of the FTA packages that China negotiates 
with other countries. As a precondition to such FTA negotiations, China 
maintains that the other party should be prepared to acknowledge that China 
is a market economy and that it would not make use of the discriminatory 
provision provided for under Section 15(a).46 This strategy has been very 
successful with many of the smaller trading partners of China, including Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Pakistan, ASEAN, all of which have recognized China’s 
market economy status in their FTA negotiations with China. For larger trad-
ing partners, however, the FTA strategy seems to be much less effective, as 
it is generally much more difficult for large traders to enter into FTAs with 
each other. Instead, China tried to petition for the grant of market economy 
status through the domestic legal regime of its trade partners. In June 2003, 
China requested the EC to re-assess its Market Economy Status. To prepare 
for this examination, the Ministry of Commerce of China issued its own Re-
port on the Development of China’s Market Economy 2003 on 13 April.47 
The EC was scheduled to make a decision on the market economy status of 
China in late June 2004. Thus, China’s decision to settle the coke dispute on 
28 May might be part of the plan to pave the way for a favourable decision 
on the market economy status. While the Chinese philosophy teaches people 
that favours shall be returned, the Europeans, however, always believe in the 
practical philosophy that ‘[w]e have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual 
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our 
duty to follow’.48 One month after, the EC announced that China had failed 
to satisfy the standards for granting market economy status, notwithstanding 
the ‘economic progress achieved by China over the past years’.49 A few days 
later, the EC gave another blow to China by announcing that it will revamp 
its Generalized System of Preferences trade benefit program for developing 
countries, with the result that many Chinese products would no longer be able 
to enjoy the GSP benefits.50
45.  Section 15(d), Accession Protocol of China.
46.  See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand-China FTA – Frequently 
Asked Questions, at <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/tradeagreements/nzchinafta/faqs.html>. See also 
China Strives for Market Economy Recognition, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/98789.
htm>.
47.  Available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003chinamarket/79411.htm>. 
48.  Speech by Lord Palmerston to the House of Commons, Hansard, 1 March 1848. See e.g., David 
Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846-1855, Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 2002, pp. 82–83.
49.  CHINA – Market economy status in trade defence investigations, 28 June 2004, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc_117795.pdf>. 
50.  BNA’s International Trade Reporter (Europe), GSP: EC to Revamp to GSP Program to Aid Devel-
oping Countries, 15 July 2004.
Henry Gao
384
In the author’s view, another more important reason for China’s eagerness 
to settle is its fear of the WTO dispute settlement system. As the VAT Rebate 
case was brought only two weeks before the EC threatened WTO action, if 
China had not settled the coke case, China would have had to fight two legal 
battles against two of the most powerful WTO Members. As China lacks 
expertise and resource on WTO dispute settlement, China would have a very 
hard time defending itself in the WTO. Thus, China chose to settle the second 
case instead.
V. China – Antidumping Duties on Kraft Linerboard 
This case concerns antidumping actions on US kraft linerboard. On 31 January 
2004, four Chinese companies filed written application to the MOFCOM of 
China on behalf of the domestic industry against imports of kraft linerboard 
from US, Thailand, Korea and Chinese Taipei.51 On 31 March, MOFCOM 
launched the investigations. The preliminary determinations were issued on 
31 May 2005, and final determinations were issued on 31 September.52 In 
both the preliminary and final determinations, the MOFCOM made positive 
findings on all three elements of imposition of anti-dumping measures, i.e., 
existence of dumping, substantial injury to the domestic industry, and causal 
relationship between dumping and injury.53 According to the final deter-
minations, the dumping margins of American firms were as high as 65.2 per 
cent.54 
The US producers held strong reservations over this decision. On 29 No-
vember 2005, the US producers submitted a petition to MOFCOM requesting 
reconsideration of the September 2005 determination. On 6 January 2006, the 
USTR further informed China that it would bring a case in the WTO unless 
China removed the antidumping order by 9 January. On 9 January 2006, 
China announced that it had decided to remove the antidumping duties after 
an administrative reconsideration.
As indicated by a senior US trade official, there were two major problems 
with the decision: lack of transparency and insufficient evidence for the deter-
mination of injury and causation.55 Indeed, both had been perennial problems 
51.  Ministry of Commerce of China, Final Determinations on the Antidumping Investigations on the 
Kraft Linerboard Products Originated from the US, Thailand, Korea and Chinese Taipei (on file with 
author). 
52.  Ibid. 
53.  Ibid. 
54.  Ibid. 
55.  BNA’s International Trade Reporter, China Lifts Dumping Duties on Linerboard in Face of US 
Threat of WTO Proceedings, 11 January 2006. 
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in Chinese antidumping proceedings.56 Even before China’s accession to the 
WTO, many Members had raised these issues in the Working Party negotia-
tions. According to these Members, ‘the current investigations by the Chinese 
authority would be judged to be inconsistent with the [WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement] if China were a Member of the WTO today’.57 Specifically, the 
Members were most concerned with the following problems: 
In certain cases, the basis for calculating dumping margins for a preliminary 
affirmative determination was not disclosed to interested parties. Further-
more, the determination of injury and causation did not appear to have been 
made on an objective examination of sufficient evidence. In the views of these 
members, bringing the Chinese anti-dumping rules into compliance with the 
WTO Agreement on its face was not sufficient. WTO-consistency had to be 
secured substantively as well.58
After its accession to the WTO, China issued a new Antidumping Regulation, 
which was further revised in 2004. In order to complement these regulations, 
the Chinese government also issued several detailed implementing rules, cover-
ing virtually every procedural step of the investigations. Problems, however, 
were far from eliminated. As noted by the USTR in its 2005 Report to Congress 
on China’s WTO Compliance, 
There continue to be a growing number of reports from US respondents 
and respondents from other WTO members, complaining about the lack 
of detailed information made available to parties and the lack of disclosure 
of the facts that form the basis for decisions made by the administering au-
thorities…… IBII [MOFCOM’s Bureau of Industry Injury Investigation] 
continues to have a spotty record of making available to respondents materi-
als generated and submitted during the course of its injury investigations, a 
situation that it has not improved. Compounding this problem is the highly 
limited disclosure to interested parties by China’s AD authorities of the es-
sential facts underlying the decisions and calculations in both dumping and 
injury investigations. This dearth of disclosure impairs the ability of US 
companies to mount an effective defence in Chinese AD investigations. Like 
last year, many respondents have criticized China’s AD authorities for not 
providing appropriate opportunities for business to comment on and provide 
input into the government’s deliberative process, the lack of domestic producer 
56.  For a detailed discussion of some of these problems, see e.g., Won-Mog Choi and Henry S. Gao, 
‘Procedural Issues in the Anti-Dumping Regulations of China: A Critical Review under the WTO 
Rules’, Chinese Journal Of International, Vol. 5, No. 3, November 2006, pp. 663–682.
57.  Working Party Report, para. 147. 
58.  Ibid. 
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information or untimely access to such information, and the opaque nature of 
decision making in injury investigations, including demonstrating the causal 
link between injury and dumping.59
In the current case, transparency seems to be lacking in two aspects. First, 
in its Public Notice for the Initiation of Antidumping Investigations, the MOF-
COM, in making its determination that the application had been made by or 
on behalf of the domestic industry, simply noted that the collective output of 
the domestic producers launching the application accounted for 31.6 per cent 
and 33.9 per cent of the total production of the like product in 2002 and 
2003, while the collective output of the producers supporting the application 
accounted for 42.6 per cent and 50.5 per cent of the total production of the 
like product in 2002 and 2003. No further details, such as the exact data on 
the total domestic production and the collective output of the applicants, have 
been provided. This might lead to doubts about the legitimacy of the initia-
tion of the investigations. Second, in the determination of normal value, export 
price and dumping margin, the authorities just gave the facts considered and 
the determinations made, but it never gave sufficient information on how the 
relevant data had been obtained, what was the detailed criteria for such analysis, 
or how the calculations were done. Such comparison normally would involve 
foreign exchange. The Chinese authorities never made clear, however, as to 
which rate it used in the calculation. 
With regard to injury determination, Article 3.1 of the Anti-dumping 
Agreement requires such determination to be ‘based on positive evidence and 
involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped im-
ports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market 
for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic 
producers of such products’. Article 3.4 further demands that ‘[t]he examina-
tion of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned 
shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having 
a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline 
in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, 
or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of 
the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments’ 
(emphasis added). By explicitly stating that ‘[t]his list is not exhaustive, nor 
can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance’, the same 
Article also requires the investigating authorities to adopt a balanced approach 
in such an examination. In the current case, however, what the investigating 
authorities had was at best a mixed picture. Indeed, many key factors indicated 
59.  p. 29. 
China’s Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
387
that the Chinese domestic firms are doing very well. For example, the output, 
volume and revenue of sales, output, wages and market share of domestic 
firms have all increased significantly over the period under investigation. Even 
some of the negative impacts are just the natural results of other positive de-
velopments: for example, the investigating authorities cited to the decline in 
employment in the sector, but this is the only logical consequence following 
a rapid increase in productivity. With such a mixed picture, the investigating 
authorities should have at least explained why some of the factors were given 
more weight than other factors in the determination, but unfortunately no such 
explanation was given. 
In terms of the determination of causation, the Anti-dumping Agreement 
requires the decision to be ‘based on an examination of all relevant evidence 
before the authorities’.60 In particular, the authorities shall also ‘examine any 
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are 
injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors 
must not be attributed to the dumped imports’.61 The Article also gives a 
few examples of the relevant factors, which include, inter alia, ‘the volume and 
prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes 
in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition 
between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology 
and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry’.62 In 
this case, however, it seems that the causal relationship between the dumped 
imports and the injury, if any, was rather tenuous. Instead, as argued by the 
American Forest & Paper Association, it seems that two domestic factors had 
been principally responsible for driving down prices in the Chinese market 
over the period of investigation: ‘(1) rapid expansion of Chinese production 
capacity for the [product], and (2) overcapacity in the corrugated box industry 
in China. Put simply, there is too much Chinese domestic capacity for the 
[product] relative to demand. Exacerbating this relative excess supply situation 
is the competitive pressure being exerted by corrugated box producers who are 
also facing an excess capacity situation’.63 
Even though this determination had been struck down in the administrative 
reconsideration process, the MOFCOM chose to avoid overturning the deci-
sion on substantive issues and relied primarily on procedural issues instead. In 
60.  Article 3.5.
61.  Ibid. 
62.  Ibid. 
63.  Submission to The Office of The United States Trade Representative on Trade Barriers to Forest 
Products for The National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers by American Forest & 





the Administrative Reconsideration Decision, the MOFCOM provided only 
one ground for the reversal, i.e., the failure of the MOFCOM to disclose all 
relevant basic facts that it relied on in making its final determination.64 Ac-
cording to the MOFCOM, this made it impossible for the relevant stakehold-
ers to make comments on such facts and violated the provisions in Article 25 
of the Antidumping Regulations, which requires all relevant basic facts to be 
disclosed.65 
VI. The Recent Disputes
In addition to the cases mentioned above, China has also been involved in four 
recent disputes. These include the cases on auto parts, subsidies, TRIPS and 
publications. With the exception of the Auto Parts case, all of the cases were 
filed only at the beginning of this year and are still in the consultation phase. 
Even for the Auto Parts case, the Panel has just concluded its first oral hearing 
in June. Thus, it is still too early to predict the results on these cases. One thing 
worth noting, however, is that China seems to have taken a more and more 
aggressive approach in WTO litigation regardless of the legal merits of the case. 
Take the Auto Parts case as an example; the legal points on this case seems to 
be quite clear: as China imposes a charge on imported auto parts but not do-
mestic auto parts, this would amount to a violation of the national treatment 
obligation under GATT Article III; alternatively, even if this charge is taken 
as a tariff, it would violate GATT Article II as well because such tariff exceeds 
China’s bound tariff on auto parts.66 Interestingly, however, China does not 
seem to be very eager to settle this case. When the case was first brought by 
the US in March 2006, the Chinese government only expressed ‘regret’ but 
did not offer to settle the case with the complainants.67 When the Panel was 
established in October 2006 upon the failure of the consultations between the 
parties, China again expressed regret but stated that it would ‘firmly defend its 
interest during the panel stage’.68 Similarly, commenting on the case brought 
by the US on China on TRIPS this April, Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi, the 
64.  Ministry of Commerce of China, Final Determinations on the Antidumping Investigations on the 
Kraft Linerboard Products Originated from the US, Thailand, Korea and Chinese Taipei (on file with 
author). 
65.  Ibid. 
66.  For a brief legal analysis on this case, see Henry Gao, ‘Commentary on the Auto Parts Case 
Brought Against China by US and EU’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 10 April 2006, p. 26.
67.  Reuters/chinadaily.com.cn, China Regrets US Action on Auto Parts, 31 March 2006, available at 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/31/content_557286.htm>. 
68.  The Permanent Mission of China to the WTO, The WTO Established the Panel on the 
Auto Parts Case, 27 October 2006, available at <http://wto.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ddfg/
whzhch/200610/20061003548481.html>. 
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top official responsible for the trade policy of China, stated that ‘the Chinese 
government is extremely dissatisfied about this’ and ‘will proactively respond 
according to the related WTO rules and see it through to the end’.69 All 
these seem to indicate that China has started to change its attitude and strategy 
towards the WTO dispute settlement system. In terms of the attitude, when it 
first joined the WTO, China had difficulty disentangling the legal issues from 
political and diplomatic concerns and viewed the initiation of legal disputes in 
the WTO as synonymous with the break-up of a diplomatic relationship. Now, 
however, China seems to regard WTO dispute settlement activities as noth-
ing unusual.70 With regard to the strategy, in the first brief encounters with 
the WTO dispute settlement system, China chose to either try to reach some 
amicable solution before a formal complaint was brought before the WTO or 
settle the case through private consultations with the complainants rather than 
let the case going all the way to the panel and Appellate Body levels. Faced 
with the recent disputes, however, China has become somewhat impatient with 
consultations and indicated that it would not hesitate to take cases to the WTO 
if bilateral consultations do not work out.71 
In the view of the author, such a policy shift shows how an over-aggressive 
litigation strategy against China in the WTO might become the victim of its 
own success: when the WTO dispute settlement system is used too frequently, 
it might just turn itself into a catalyst for change in the litigation strategy of 
China at one point. If China were to participate in the WTO dispute settle-
ment system at the same rate as the participation of the US and EU, it would 
not be long before the WTO dispute settlement system became jammed. Even 
if the WTO manages to handle all these cases brought by or against China, 
it would take a long time before a final decision by the Panel or the Appel-
late Body could be reached on these cases.72 Meanwhile, as the WTO does 
not provide interim or retrospective relief, the trade partners have to suffer 
nullification or impairment to their trade interests during the process of the 
litigation. Thus, while aggressive litigation in a particular case might be a use-
ful approach, the combination of aggressive litigation in multiple cases might 
69.  Wu: US Piracy Case Will Harm Trade Ties, 24 April 2007, available at <http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2007-04/24/content_858638.htm>. 
70.  In June 2006, for example, Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai stated that China has the right 
to use WTO dispute settlement system and would not hesitate to resort to the system when 
needed. See People’s Net, Bo Xilai Made Stern Warnings against Double Standards in Trade, 3 June 
2006, available at <http://finance.21cn.com/news/cjyw/2005/06/03/2155362.shtml>. 
71.  Statement by Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai at the press conference for the 5th session of the 
10th National People’s Congress (NPC) on 12 March 2007. The text of Minister Bo’s statements 
is available online at <http://video.mofcom.gov.cn/videocast/netcast.asp?id=21>. 
72.  Even though the DSU sets out strict time limits for cases in the WTO, it is not unusual for pan-
els to have to prolong their process due to several factors, including the complexity of the issues 




simply backfire. On balance, a strategy that puts more focus on consultation 
and negotiation rather than formal WTO dispute settlement might serve the 
interests of the complainants better, especially if the threats of bringing WTO 
cases are no longer working. After all, we should not forget that the aim of the 
WTO dispute settlement system is to secure ‘positive solution’73 and ‘prompt 
settlement’74 of disputes.
VII. Conclusion
As we can see from above, contrary to the gloomy predictions made before 
China’s accession, the WTO dispute settlement system so far has been quite 
effective in dealing with China. In the first few cases in which China has 
participated, especially in the cases in which China was on the defensive side, 
China has managed to solve them by negotiations and consultations. As argued 
by the author in a recent article, China’s initial reluctance to make full use 
of the WTO dispute settlement system could be explained by the following 
factors.75 First, the senior leadership did not have a proper understanding of 
the WTO dispute settlement system and attached too much political emphasis 
to the process. Second, China did not have much experience or expertise on 
WTO dispute settlement. Third, China maintained constant trade surpluses 
with its major trade partners and this made it awkward for China to aggres-
sively defend its interests. 
There is no guarantee, however, that these factors will always stay the same. 
Indeed, changes have emerged already. First, as illustrated by the recent com-
ments of the senior Chinese officials on the WTO complaints brought against 
China, the top leaders no longer view the legal battles in the WTO as political 
standoffs. Second, China has gained more and more experience in the WTO 
dispute settlement system by participating as main parties or third parties.76 
Third, while China still maintains some big surpluses in its trade with its 
major trade partners, the growth of such surpluses has gradually slowed down. 
Recently, the MOFCOM has even announced that ‘cutting the huge trade 
surplus is the priority task for 2007’77 and has taken substantive measures, 
such as the revaluation of the Yuan and the abolition of the export rebates to 
try to reduce the surplus. 
73.  DSU Article 3.7.
74.  DSU Article 3.3. 
75.  See Henry Gao, ‘Aggressive Legalism: the East Asian Experience and Lessons for China’, in 
Henry Gao and Don Lewis (eds.), China’s Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, at 
pp. 348–351.
76.  As of 26 July 2007, China has participated in 61 WTO cases as third parties. 
77.  China Daily, Huge Trade Surplus to Be Reduced, available at <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/newsrelease/commonnews/200701/20070104273133.html>. 
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With such a vastly different landscape, the other WTO Members might 
discover that they can no longer rely on an over-aggressive litigation strategy 
against China in the WTO: when the WTO dispute settlement system is used 
too frequently, China might just snap at one point and decide to defend these 
cases rigorously, regardless of their legal merits. While China as well as any 
other WTO Member is legally entitled to make full use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, an aggressive defensive policy and over-emphasis on legal 
rights could well push the multilateral trading system into the wrong direction. 
As argued by Hudec, an international legal system does not require rigorously 
binding procedures to be generally effective, while strong procedures by them-
selves are not likely to make a legal system very effective if they do not have 
sufficient political will behind them.78 As illustrated by the calls in the US 
Congress to withdraw from the WTO,79 too many cases and adverse rulings 
against a Member can weaken the domestic political support for participating 
in the WTO and make it difficult for the government of such Member to 
contribute the necessary political will to the WTO. Moreover, with the increas-
ing imbalance between the legislative and judicial organs of the WTO, some 
disputes (such as the one on the revaluation of Yuan) might drag the WTO 
panels and Appellate Body into messy political questions and put undue politi-
cal pressures on the (politically) fragile dispute settlement system. If all of these 
happen, it will be too late to close Pandora’s Box again. 
78.  Robert E. Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of The First 
Three Years’, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, at 11. 
79.  Statement by Congressman Ron Paul, Introducing Legislation Calling For The United States To 




Annex: Cases Taken By, Against, and Threatened Against China in the 
WTO (in Chronological Order)
Case Name and Number Complainant(s) Respondent Timeline Result
United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on 





tions received on 26 
March 2002. Panel 
Report circulated on 
11 July 2003. Ap-
pellate Body Report 
circulated on 10 
November 2003
China won. 
China – Value-Added Tax 
on Integrated 
Circuits, DS309
United States China Request for Consulta-
tions received on 18 
March 2004. Mutu-
ally Agreed Solution 
notified on 6 October 
2005. 
China settled 
the case by 
agreeing 
to the US 
requests. 
China – Measures Affecting 
the Export of Coke
European 
Communities
China EC threatened WTO 
action on 31 March 
2004. China settled 
with the EC on 28 
May 2004. 
China settled 
the case by 
agreeing 
to the EC 
requests.
China – Antidumping Duties 
on Kraft 
Linerboard
United States China US threatened WTO 
action on 6 January 
2006. China removed 
the measure on 9 
January 2006. 
China settled 
the case by 
agreeing 
to the US 
requests.
China – Measures Affecting 






China Request for Consulta-
tions received on 30 
March 2006. Panel es-





China – Certain Measures 
Granting Refunds, Reduc-
tions or Exemptions from 




China Request for Consulta-




China – Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property 
Rights, DS362
United States China Request for Consulta-




China – Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, 
DS363
United States China Request for Consulta-
tions received on 10 
April 2007.
Consultation 
in progress.
